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IMPORTING DAUBERT TO 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES THROUGH 
THE INFORMATION QUALITY ACT 
Wendy E. Wagner* 
INTRODUCTION 
Exasperated at the inability of the common law to adequately 
protect the public health and environment from toxic hazards, 
Congress passed a series of vigorous environmental laws in the 
1970s to regulate activities involving dangerous products and 
wastes.1 The common law had proven woefully ineffective to 
redress these harms since it required proof of harm and convincing 
evidence of causation before granting recovery.  Stringent common 
law causation requirements thus effectively exculpated most 
defendants who produced or disposed of toxics due to substantial 
scientific unknowns regarding the long-term effects of their 
                                                          
 * Joe A. Worsham Centennial Professor of Law, University of Texas 
School of Law. 
1 See, e.g., ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: 
LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 72 (3d ed. 2000) (arguing that the “inadequacies of 
the common law” help explain the “rapid growth of regulatory legislation”); 
SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: 
RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 15 (2003). 
When Congress adopted risk regulation, it rejected the common law 
paradigm in favor of a regulatory system which would reduce 
technological risks before they caused significant harm to individuals 
and the environment. Congress accomplished this goal by designing 
statutory triggers that permit the government to act on the basis of 
anticipated harm. 
Id. 
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activities.2 Congress appreciated these inherent limitations in the 
common law and developed a broad regulatory system that 
regulates potential hazards without requiring definitive evidence of 
harm as a prerequisite for regulatory control.3 
Because the evidentiary demands of the common law and 
regulation are so different, regulators and the courts historically 
have had little in common when it comes to assessing scientific 
evidence. The fact that courts developed a new, vigorous test 
called “Daubert”4 to scrutinize scientific evidence in order to 
determine whether it is “reliable” before proceeding to trial was 
essentially irrelevant to regulators’ assessments of risks.5 
Regulators generally err on the side of protecting the public health 
and environment when crafting protective regulatory standards and 
do not require vigorous gate-keeping of scientific evidence in order 
to avoid juror confusion or the excessive transaction costs 
associated with trials.6 
With the passage of the Information (or Data) Quality Act 
(IQA) in 2001,7 however, the foundations of these heretofore 
separate institutional worlds are beginning to collide. The IQA 
imposes an evidentiary screening process on regulatory agencies 
                                                          
2 See generally Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture 
of Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 790-96 (1997) (summarizing 
common law standards). 
3 See, e.g., SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 1, at ch. 3; see also Wendy 
E. Wagner, The ‘Bad Science’ Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate over the Role of 
Science in Public Health and Environmental Regulation, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 63, 85-87 (2003) (listing the environmental statutes that require only 
limited evidence of harm as a precondition to regulation). 
4 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
5 Not surprisingly, a review of the entire Federal Register reveals that the 
Daubert case was referenced only four times by a federal agency and never in a 
way that was intended to alter or supplement the agency’s independent 
assessment of technical information.  Search on Westlaw for term “Daubert” in 
Federal Register database, November 5, 2003, with date restriction “aft 1/1993” 
(the date Daubert was published). 
6 See infra Part I.A (discussing EPA’s congressional directive to err on the 
side of protection in their regulations). 
7 Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 
2001 § 515, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 144 Stat. 2763 (2001). 
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that looks very much like the courts’ Daubert test since it equips 
regulatory participants with the opportunity to file complaints for 
“correction” of information disseminated by agencies that they 
believe is unreliable.8 Just as Daubert motions seek to exclude 
scientific testimony that cannot be validated, IQA complaints 
generally seek to exclude “unreliable” research from public 
dissemination or agency use.9 The IQA thus provides a rather 
dramatic signal of growing institutional overlap in the processes 
governing the use of scientific information for regulation and 
common law adjudication.10 
In this commentary, I discuss this new convergence heralded 
by the Daubert-like test imposed on administrative agencies, 
particularly the Environmental Protection Agency, and consider its 
significance. While some celebrate an added check on regulatory 
decision-making as a positive development,11 this essay 
approaches the IQA more skeptically given its thin justification 
and suspicious, industry-based origins.12 Part I provides 
background on the agencies’ use of scientific information and the 
changes to these practices introduced by the IQA. Part II explores 
whether some of the most problematic features of Daubert are 
likely to be replicated, and even amplified, in the administrative 
agencies as they implement the IQA. Part III closes with two 
reforms to the IQA and Daubert that promise to reduce at least 
some of their worst adverse effects, while maximizing the benefits 
of imposing an added screening test to sort the “good” science 
from the “bad.” 
I. BACKGROUND ON THE INFORMATION QUALITY ACT 
Agencies have considerable capacity to consider a range of 
scientific research that has bearing on public health and 
environmental protection. Most importantly, the agencies’ 
                                                          
8  Id. 
9 See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (discussing IQA petitions). 
10 See, e.g., infra Part II.A.4. 
11 See, e.g., Frederick R. Anderson, Data Quality Act, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 14, 
2002, at B9. 
12 See Part I.B. 
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authorizing statutes generally direct them to bypass heavy burdens 
of proof in promulgating regulations, thus allowing them to 
consider all available science. By contrast, common law judges 
must ensure the reliability of proffered scientific evidence early in 
the litigation in order to preserve precious judicial and litigant 
resources.13 Also in contrast to the courts, agencies are staffed with 
hundreds of experts and can press still more into the service of 
overseeing the quality of scientific evidence used for regulation. 
Courts do not have such expert support and instead are hamstrung 
by limited resources and prohibitions against ex parte contact that 
constrain their ability to access expertise outside of the litigation.14  
This background section considers the agencies’ use and oversight 
of scientific evidence relative to the common law courts both 
before and after passage of the IQA. 
A. Checks on the Quality of Science Used for Regulation 
Agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
have developed multiple oversight processes to ensure that they 
find and use the best available science in their regulation, 
especially when public health is in jeopardy from the failure to 
regulate proactively.15 The process for incorporating science into 
regulation is messy; politics and economic interests often drive and 
sometimes affect the resolution of the decision-making exercise.16 
But in contrast to courts, there are numerous internal and external 
checks to ensure that an agency uses science wisely in its decision-
                                                          
13 See sources cited supra note 3. 
14 See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein & Catherine Wimberly, Secrecy in Law and 
Science, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 27-29 (2001) (discussing limitations on the 
ability of judges to do independent research on scientific issues raised in a case). 
15 See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 3, at  65, 81-86 (describing the checks and 
balances that apply to EPA science). 
16 See, e.g., Nicholas A. Ashford et al., A Hard Look at Federal Regulation 
of Formaldehyde: A Departure from Reasoned Decisionmaking, 7 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 342 (1983) (“EPA’s formaldehyde deliberations powerfully 
illustrate the ease with which matters of policy may be confused with matters of 
science . . . [EPA’s] analysis purports to justify, in the name of science, a risk 
assessment policy far less protective of human health than the agency’s prior 
policy.”). 
WAGNERMACRO2.DOC 4/23/2004  12:54 PM 
 SCREENING AGENCY INFORMATION  593 
making. For example, to ensure their scientific assessments are 
competent, agencies often empanel experts to oversee their use of 
science in regulatory decisions17 and routinely employ various 
forms of internal and external peer review.18 In cases when science 
has direct regulatory consequences, agencies also risk an appeal to 
the court of appeals by those concerned with the factual veracity of 
their rulemakings.19 Controversial technical decisions made by 
agencies are scrutinized informally by Congress (usually in the 
course of oversight hearings), and in exceptional cases, the public. 
Because of its vulnerability to multiple reprimands from the courts, 
Congress, the White House, and the public at large, agencies have 
many reasons to get the science right the first time, particularly 
when their science-based decisions have direct and significant 
consequences for public health and the economy. 
These multiple checks and balances substantially improve the 
scientific grounding of resulting regulatory products. At least in the 
case of EPA, various expert advisory panels, including the 
National Academy of Science (NAS), and prominent academics 
conclude that EPA does a satisfactory-to-good job identifying 
reliable science and using it in regulation.20 Although there 
                                                          
17 Science advisory boards are mandatory for EPA’s promulgation of air 
quality standards and for regulatory action on pesticides. See 42 U.S.C. § 
7409(d)(2)(B)-(C) (2000); 7 U.S.C. § 136w(d)-(e) (2000); see also 42 U.S.C. § 
4365(c)(1) (2000) (establishing a science advisory board to review scientific and 
technical information relevant to any proposed action under EPA’s authority if 
EPA is forwarding the proposal to any other federal agency for formal review). 
18 See, e.g., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PEER REVIEW HANDBOOK (2d ed. 
2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/osp/spc/prhandbk.pdf. 
19 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B) (1996). 
20 See, e.g., Strengthening Science at the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency—National Research Council (NRC) Findings: Hearing Before the 
House Subcomm. on Energy and Env’t, 106th Cong. 106-97 (2000); COMM. ON 
RESEARCH & PEER REVIEW IN EPA, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., STRENGTHENING 
SCIENCE AT THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: RESEARCH 
MANAGEMENT AND PEER REVIEW PRACTICES (2000); TED GREENWOOD, 
KNOWLEDGE AND DISCRETION IN GOVERNMENT REGULATION (1984); MARK R. 
POWELL, SCIENCE AT EPA: INFORMATION IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS 112-17 
(1999); EXPERT PANEL ON THE ROLE OF SCI. AT EPA, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, SAFEGUARDING THE FUTURE: CREDIBLE SCIENCE, CREDIBLE 
DECISIONS (1992); SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS 
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remains a cluster of critics who argue that EPA routinely uses “bad 
science,”21 a closer examination of these charges reveals that most 
of the disagreements are in fact over agency policy, rather than 
scientific quality, and these critics rarely identify problems with 
EPA’s use of science in settings that have direct regulatory 
consequences.22 Thus, most of the concrete evidence to date 
suggests that EPA is relatively adept at finding and using the best 
science available to formulate protective regulations. 
In addition, most environmental laws make it clear that not all 
science is weighed equally in terms of its implications for 
regulation. Because Congress demands that EPA err on the side of 
protection in most statutes, EPA is legally justified, if not 
compelled, to place lower demands on scientific developments 
suggesting that regulations might not be protective enough, and a 
higher bar on developments that suggest more permissive 
standards are possible without compromising public health. As a 
result, the scrutiny required of scientific information used for 
regulation also depends on the statute and regulatory context. 
B. The Information Quality Act 
Against this backdrop of relatively robust internal and external 
oversight processes governing EPA’s use of science, the IQA 
imposes an entirely new and additional oversight process.  The 
Act, which was originally passed as an unnoticed rider to an 
appropriations bill,23 works by providing interested parties with the 
                                                          
 
AS POLICYMAKERS (1990)’. 
21 See, e.g., Richard Shelby, Accountability and Transparency: Public 
Access to Federally Funded Research Data, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 371 (2000); 
Sen. James Inhofe et al., Inst. for Policy Innovation, Big Government and Bad 
Science: Ten Case Studies in Regulatory Abuse (Bonner R. Cohen, Ph.D. & 
Thomas A. Giovanetti, eds. Nov. 30, 1999), available at http://ipi.org/ipi/ 
IPIPublications.nsf/PublicationLookupFullText/ 
1C84DBE6BCD5AEE98625683A001A354C; see generally Junkscience.com, 
at http://www.junkscience.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2003). 
22 See Wagner, supra note 3, at 78-81. 
23 From the oral history surrounding its passage, it appears that most 
members of Congress were unaware of the Act’s content or existence. See, e.g., 
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ability to file petitions to “correct” information that an agency has 
publicized.24 This correction process must include an appeal 
process inside the agency.25 The Act has broad coverage: 
“Disseminated information”26 should be corrected if it is found to 
lack “reliability,” “objectivity,” “integrity,” or “utility”27 and 
“information” is interpreted to include essentially anything but 
opinions from agency staff, thus covering far more than narrow 
categories of “data” or “science.”28 Moreover, the Act reaches 
                                                          
 
NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., ENSURING THE QUALITY OF DATA DISSEMINATED BY THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: WORKSHOP # 1, at 32 (April 21, 2002) [hereinafter 
NAS, DATA QUALITY TRANSCRIPT, DAY 1], available at 
http://www7.nationalacademies.org/stl/4-21-02_Transcript.doc (comments of 
Alan Morrison) (stating that the Data Quality Act “came up as part of a very 
large appropriations act that most people didn’t even know contained this 
particular piece of legislation in it”). It also appears from the oral history that it 
was an industrial lobbyist, Jim Tozzi, who leads the Center for Regulatory 
Effectiveness, and not a congressional staffer that drafted and guided the rider 
through Congress. See, e.g., James T. O’Reilly, The 411 on 515: How OIRA’s 
Expanded Information Roles in 2002 Will Impact Rule-Making and Agency 
Publicity Actions, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 835, 840 n.20 (2002) (“Discussion at the 
American Bar Association Fall Administrative Law Conference dinner . . . 
honoring past directors of the OIRA, suggested that Jim Tozzi, former OIRA 
director, had been the principal drafter of the 515 language.”). 
24 Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 
2001 § 515, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 144 Stat. 2763 (2001). 
25 See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing 
the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by 
Federal Agencies; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. 8452, 8459 (Feb. 2, 2002) 
[hereinafter OMB Data Quality Guidelines]. 
26 “Disseminate” means putting out into the public view, although there are 
a number of exemptions, some of which exempt regulatory information that 
regulated parties submit. Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Specifically, “information” means: 
any communication or representation of knowledge such as facts or 
data, in any medium or form, including textual, numerical, graphic, 
cartographic, narrative, or audiovisual forms. This definition includes 
information that an agency disseminates from a web page, but does not 
include the provision of hyperlinks to information that others 
disseminate. This definition does not include opinions where the 
agency’s presentation makes it clear that what is being offered is 
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back to information disseminated before passage of the Act, 
sweeping older agency documents within the scope of potential 
IQA challenges.29 
The IQA is quite new—only mid-way through its second year 
of implementation—thus it is still early to predict how it will be 
used by regulatory participants. To date there have been only a few 
IQA challenges, averaging about one per month for the main target 
of the IQA, the EPA.30 Nonetheless, most of these petitions are 
major and take on significant, science-based regulatory 
developments.31 For example, in spring 2003, the Competitive 
Enterprise Institute (CEI) filed a complaint petitioning several 
agencies to withdraw the climate change models used in the 
National Assessment on Climate Change from agency websites and 
other public databases, arguing that they were unreliable.32 CEI’s 
                                                          
 
someone’s opinion rather than fact or the agency’s views. 
Id. at 8460. 
29 See, e.g., Morgan Lewis & Bockius Request for Correction (Aug. 19, 
2003) [hereinafter Morgan, Lewis, & Bockius Petition] (seeking correction of 
information contained in a 1986 EPA publication entitled Guidance for 
Preventing Asbestos Disease Among Auto Mechanics (the “Gold Book”)), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/oeiinter/qualityguidelines/afreqcorrectionsub/ 
12467.pdf. 
30 See Envtl. Prot. Agency, Requests for Correction Submitted to EPA, 
available at http://www.epa.gov/quality/information guidelines/ipg-list.html 
(last updated Mar. 17, 2004). 
31 For a summary of IQA petitions filed by industry against both public 
health and environmental agencies, see Ctr. for Regulatory Effectiveness, Status 
of Data Quality Act Petitions, available at http://www.thecre.com/quality/ 
20030211_cei.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2004). 
32 See Competitive Enter. Inst., Petition to Cease Dissemination of the 
National Assessment on Climate Change (Feb. 20, 2003) [hereinafter CEI 
Petition], available at http://www.cei.org/pdf/3360.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 
2004). The agencies denied the petitions and CEI’s internal appeals. CEI then 
appealed its case to the D.C. District Court where CEI ultimately withdrew its 
case. See, e.g., Press Release, Competitive Enterprise Institute, CEI Global 
Warming Suit Draws Ire of Northeast States Attorneys General (Aug. 23, 2003), 
available at http://www.cei.org/gencon/003,03598.cfm. The petition was 
ultimately withdrawn because CEI believed the Bush administration adequately 
acknowledged the weaknesses of the models. Press Release, Competitive Enter. 
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approach—focusing on significant regulatory information and 
asking for its withdrawal—is repeated in other major IQA petitions 
filed against EPA, including technical petitions seeking the 
withdrawal or exclusion of: pathbreaking research on the endocrine 
disruption properties of Atrazine; brochures warning auto 
mechanics about risks of exposure to asbestos from brake linings; 
an EPA technical review of Diisonoyl phthalate (DINP), a toxin 
used in PVC products; and a letter requesting EPA to ignore public 
interest group comments on dioxin risks in a biosolids rule and 
threatening an IQA action if EPA relies on the comments.33 
All of these IQA petitions bear a striking resemblance to 
Daubert motions. Like Daubert, the requested remedy often 
involves complete exclusion or withdrawal of the challenged 
information from public databases.34 Also like Daubert, the criteria 
for “good” versus “bad” science or science-related information is 
amorphous, but the inability to validate or replicate the study is one 
of the primary grounds for challenging the information. Finally, 
those filing the complaints generally do not limit their concerns to 
scientific quality or reliability, but also contest embedded 
judgments and policy choices in the agencies’ use of scientific 
research, even though the challenges are framed as if they 
concerned only technical information.35 
                                                          
 
Inst., White House Acknowledges Climate Report Was not Subjected to Sound 
Science Law: CEI Drops Lawsuit against Bush Administration (Nov. 6, 2003), 
available at http://cei.org/gencon/003,03740.cfm. 
33 See, e.g., Kans. Corn Growers Ass’n, The Triazine Network, & the Ctr. 
for Regulatory Effectiveness, Request for Correction of Information Contained 
in the Atrazine Environmental Risk Assessment, Docket No. OPP – 34237A, at 
2 (Nov. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Atrazine Petition], available at 
http://www.thecre.com/pdf/petition-atrazine2B.pdf; Morgan Lewis & Bockius 
Petition, supra note 29; Ctr. for Regulatory Effectiveness, Request to EPA for 
Correction of “Technical Review of Diisononyl Phthalate,” Oct. 16, 2003 
[hereinafter CRE Phthalate Petition], available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
oei/qualityguidelines/afreqcorrectionsub/13166rfc.pdf; Letter from William G. 
Kelly, Center for Regulatory Effectiveness (CRE) to EPA Water Docket (Feb. 
27, 2003) [hereinafter Kelly letter], available at http://www.thecre.com/pdf/ 
20030310_biosolids.pdf. 
34 See supra notes 32 & 33. 
35 See infra Section II.A.1. 
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II. IMPORTING MISCHIEF? 
On the surface, the similarities between Daubert and the IQA 
would seem a positive development since agencies and courts will 
adopt similar standards and processes for reviewing and screening 
science used in legal decision-making. But there are important 
institutional differences between the agencies and the courts that 
could lead the IQA to be more damaging and potentially 
counterproductive as compared with the courts’ use of Daubert. 
First, unlike Daubert, IQA challenges are not adversarial and do 
not provide potential opponents with notice or a formal 
opportunity to contest petitions.36  Under the IQA, an interested 
party simply sends a letter to an agency asking for information to 
be withdrawn, and the complaints are resolved by the agencies 
without the benefit of broader public input. Second, the decision-
maker is a political agency, rather than a “neutral” jurist.  The 
resulting decisions are thus more likely to be affected by politics, 
even though the decisions might purport to be based on the 
agency’s scientific judgment.37 Third and compounding the first 
two problems, agency resolutions of IQA petitions become 
national proclamations about the quality of the science underlying 
disseminated information. By contrast, in the courts the resolution 
of scientific quality is most often resolved at the trial court level 
and is thus limited in its impact.38 Fourth, it is not clear what 
administrative problems the IQA is intended to fix, again a stark 
contrast with the courts’ need for some means of overseeing 
scientific evidence introduced into the trial process. At least with 
respect to EPA, for example, there is little evidence of a problem 
                                                          
36 At least one interest group has filed a counter-challenge on a Data 
Quality petition, presumably because the organization learned of the petition 
before it was decided and had the resources to object. See OMB Watch, Analysis 
on the Petition against the US Fish and Wildlife Service on Salmon Farming, 
VOL. 4 NO. 10 OMB WATCHER, available at 
http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/1521//. 
37 See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk 
Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (1995). 
38 Cf. General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
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with the quality of science used in regulation.39 Current legal 
protections that govern agency decision-making, most specifically 
the notice and comment and appeal processes,40 moreover, make 
the IQA process largely superfluous and redundant.41 
Compounding concerns about the capability of the IQA to 
improve the quality of regulatory science are deficiencies that 
afflict the IQA’s model—Daubert—itself. Recent research 
suggests that Daubert is producing some unexpected, but 
potentially serious adverse side effects, even in its more modest 
use by the courts. First, since Daubert situates the judge as the 
expert who must determine the reliability and validity of scientific 
testimony,42 there is a risk of significant, substantive errors in 
admissibility rulings.  Such substantive errors not only threaten to 
impair the accuracy of adjudications, but could alienate the 
scientific community and undercut the legitimacy of the courts.43 
Daubert also imposes significant new process costs on both 
litigants and judges.  Daubert can thus alter the adversarial playing 
field simply by virtue of the added time and resources it demands. 
These problems with Daubert appear to be repeated and amplified 
by the agencies as they implement the IQA. 
                                                          
39 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
40 In addition, at the time the Data Quality Act was passed, EPA had 
already developed four separate programs dedicated to ensuring the quality of 
information relevant to regulation, including an electronic error correction 
system. See, e.g., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Draft Data Quality Guidelines, 67 
Fed. Reg. 21,234 (proposed Apr. 30, 2002) (describing four separate 
mechanisms in place to ensure the “quality, objectivity, utility and integrity” of 
information used and produced by EPA). 
41 See Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB’s Dubious Peer Review Procedures, 34 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10064, 10065 (2003). 
42 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
43 See, e.g., THE PROJECT ON SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND PUBLIC POLICY 
(SKAPP), DAUBERT: THE MOST INFLUENTIAL CASE YOU’VE NEVER HEARD OF 
(2003) [hereinafter SKAPP REPORT] (report by scientists critical of Daubert), 
available at http://www.defendingscience.org/pdf/DaubertReport.pdf. 
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A. Substantive Errors in Applying a Daubert-like Test to Sort  
Reliable Science from Unreliable Science 
1. Blurring the Line between Science and Policy 
Under Daubert, courts have struggled with expert testimony 
that is only partly based on testable research, like weight-of-the-
evidence judgments on causation that string together a series of 
disparate studies.44 The controversy over the Sandoz case, where 
the trial judge excluded the experts’ weight-of-the-evidence 
testimony as inadmissible under Daubert, is a recent example of 
this struggle.45 In that case, even though the individual studies and 
reports supported a hypothesis that there was a causal connection 
between plaintiffs’ stroke and defendant’s medicine, Parlodel, the 
district court held that the experts’ testimony presenting this 
causation hypothesis did not pass Daubert’s reliability test.46 As a 
result, the district court granted summary judgment to defendants 
since plaintiffs had no remaining scientific evidence in support of 
causation, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.47 The opinion has 
been criticized because the judge rejected plaintiffs’ causation 
evidence, even though the circumstantial quality of the evidence 
arguably presented a weighing decision that the jury is empowered 
to make. The Sandoz decision, it is argued, thus blurs the line 
between weighing the available evidence, typically a jury decision, 
and screening out unreliable science, an evidentiary issue for the 
judge. 
                                                          
44 Carl F. Cranor & John A. Eastmond, Scientific Ignorance and Reliable 
Patterns of Evidence in Toxic Tort Causation: Is there a Need for Liabilty 
Reform?, 64 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 26-45 (2001). 
45 Siharath v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (N.D. Ga. 
2001), aff’d sub nom. Rider v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 
2002). 
46 Siharath, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 1370 (holding that to prevail, plaintiff must 
provide “at least some support for the causal hypothesis in . . . epidemiological 
literature, a predictable chemical mechanism, general acceptance in learned 
treatises, a plausible animal model, and dozens of well-documented case 
reports”). 
47 Rider, 295 F. 3d at 1202-03. 
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These struggles in determining which decisions are best left 
exclusively to experts and which involve weight-of-the-evidence 
judgments that should be shared with policymakers or jurors are 
being repeated, with considerably more confusion, under the IQA. 
Despite the fact that the Act purports to apply only to the reliability 
of technical information, and not to agency policy judgments, the 
petitions filed against EPA repeat this blurring of policy and 
science under the guise of scientific fact finding. In one of the most 
significant information quality challenges brought to date, the 
manufacturer and agricultural users of an herbicide, Atrazine, 
sought to exclude a recent series of studies done on the hormonal 
effects of Atrazine from EPA’s decision regarding re-registration 
of the herbicide .48 The petitioners argue that the science 
acceptable for regulation must be conducted only under agency-
approved protocols and since EPA has not yet promulgated tests 
for measuring endocrine disruption effects, the studies must be 
excluded.49 The industry’s argument, however, has nothing to do 
with technical issues, but instead advances a policy position that 
new scientific discoveries cannot be considered in regulating 
pesticides until after the underlying methods have been formally 
promulgated by EPA. 
Other IQA petitions also take issue with EPA’s policy 
judgments rather than with the technical merits of EPA’s 
decisions.50 In one complaint, industry challenged EPA’s barium 
risk assessment in large part because it disagreed with the agency’s 
conservative assumptions used in preventative regulation.51 In the 
                                                          
48 Atrazine Petition, supra note 33. 
49 Atrazine Petition, supra note 33. Petitioners argue: “EPA’s statements in 
the atrazine Environmental Risk Assessment regarding atrazine’s purported 
endocrine effects violate government-wide data quality standards. These 
government-wide standards require proper test validation before the tests are 
considered reliable and reproducible. There are no validated endocrine-effects 
tests for atrazine.”Id. at 1. 
50 See also Kelly letter, supra note 33 (characterizing risk assessment as a 
science that does not involve policy). 
51 Chem. Products Div., Request for Correction of the IRIS Barium 
Substance File-Information (Oct. 29, 2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
oei/qualityguidelines/afreqcorrectionsub/2293.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2004); 
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Request for Correction of the IRS Barium and 
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CEI petitions, the organization argued that the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration, and by association the Office of 
Science and Technology Policy, used flawed models to predict the 
effects of global warming and that all reports and data relying on 
those models should be withdrawn. CEI did not, however, 
acknowledge the basic policy decisions involved in deciding 
whether to suspend use of the models until a more robust dataset or 
model is produced, nor did they discuss whether other, more 
accurate predictive models are currently available.52 
2.  Conflating Responsibility for Producing Research 
One of the recurring criticisms of the common law courts’ 
response to toxic tort cases is their failure to take into account a 
manufacturer’s or polluter’s social responsibility to produce basic 
evidence on the safety of their activities. Professor Berger and 
others have written about the tendency of the common law 
causation standard to be imposed in ways that increase the 
plaintiffs’ burden of proving harm, despite the fact that the 
defendant polluters and manufacturers typically enjoy superior 
expertise and often superior knowledge of product harms.53 Indeed, 
by requiring plaintiffs to produce this evidence as a prerequisite to 
maintaining a viable suit, the common law perversely awards 
manufacturer ignorance.54 
                                                          
 
Compounds Substance File (Jan. 30, 2003) (letter from Paul Gilman, Ph.D., 
Assistant Administrator of EPA, to Jerry Cook, Technical Director, Chemical 
Products Division), available at http://www.epa.gov/oei/qualityguidelines/ 
afreqcorrectionsub/2293Response.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2004). 
52 CEI Petition, supra note 33. 
53 See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes 
Towards a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 
(1997); see also Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure 
Litigation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1, 41 (1995); Wagner, supra note 2, at 786-89. 
54 There are proposals for reforming the causation standard in keeping with 
other burden shifting devices, like res ipsa loquitur, that penalize defendants 
from profiting from ignorance regarding the harms they might be imposing on 
others. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Causation in Government Regulation and 
Toxic Torts, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1307, 1324-25 (1998). 
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Rigorous, Daubert-like scientific screening devices act 
indirectly to exacerbate the informational burden on plaintiffs by 
providing defendants additional opportunities to challenge 
plaintiffs’ evidence.55 For example, decisions like Sandoz permit 
defendants to challenge the whole of plaintiffs’ causation case 
through a single evidentiary hearing that bases resolution of the 
case on whether plaintiffs’ weight-of-the-evidence testimony can 
be tested.56 There are also reports that Daubert challenges are so 
expensive that they can alter the financial calculus of plaintiffs to 
bring suit.57   
The IQA exacerbates this problem regarding the lack of 
manufacturer and polluter responsibility for producing information 
on their harmful activities, this time in a legal setting where 
Congress specifically intended to lighten the scientific burden of 
regulators to respond to health and environmental threats.58 In most 
environmental statutes, agencies are directed to pass protective 
regulations in the face of uncertainty and to err on the side of 
protecting the public health and the environment.59 This creates 
incentives for regulated parties to produce exculpatory 
information, rather than burdening regulators with heavy 
information production requirements.  The IQA risks counteracting 
these statutory commands to err on the side of public health by 
providing regulatory parties with an added mechanism for 
challenging scientific evidence before regulations take effect.60 
Moreover, since the IQA operates without the requisite notice and 
comment process required by the Administrative Procedure Act 
                                                          
55 See Margaret A. Berger, Upsetting the Balance Between Adverse 
Interests: The Impact of the Supreme Court’s Trilogy on Expert Testimony in 
Toxic Tort Litigation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2001). 
56 See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text. 
57 See infra notes 71-71 and accompanying text. 
58 See, e.g., SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 1, at 15. 
59 Id. 
60 Two more recent and sophisticated petitions exemplify the considerable 
extra time and resources that will likely be required of EPA to respond to 
lengthy tedious requests for information correction. See CRE, Phthalate Petition, 
supra note 33; Perchlorate Study Group, Data Quality Act Petition on three EPA 
Technical Documents on Perchlorate, Dec. 3, 2003, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/oei/qualityguidelines/afreqcorrectionsub. 
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and potentially with no or limited judicial review, this new process 
could conceivably be used by agencies themselves to circumvent 
statutory commands when it is politically attractive to do so. For 
example, the EPA might agree with the IQA petition on Atrazine 
and hold that pre-approved protocols are needed before 
pathbreaking research on new risks of pesticides will be considered 
in regulating those pesticides, even though this decision constitutes 
an important policy decision that arguably conflicts with the 
protective pesticide mandate61 and should at least undergo notice 
and comment. 
3. Scientific Errors 
The most worrisome aspect of Daubert is the possibility that 
judges will make mistakes, particularly in erroneously excluding 
valuable scientific evidence.62 Under Daubert, a federal judge 
reaches a formal “legal decision” about the reliability of scientific 
testimony and its accompanying research. This powerful legal 
declaration on scientific quality, if erroneous, might not only 
impair the adjudication of a particular case, but might taint 
researchers or experts unfairly. Although errors are inevitable, 
especially on difficult scientific evidence challenges, there is 
currently little systematic research on the frequency or significance 
of judicial errors in applying Daubert. 
It is not clear whether the agencies are more or less susceptible 
to making errors on the technical merits of scientific evidence. 
Equipped with an army of scientific staff, the agencies can be 
expected to fare better than the courts in their technical 
competence to resolve challenges to the quality of scientific 
                                                          
61 See, e.g., Envtl. Defense Fund v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 
1976). 
62 See David S. Caudill & Lewis H. LaRue, Why Judges Applying the 
Daubert Trilogy Need to Know About the Social, Institutional, and Rhetorical—
And Not Just the Methodological—Aspects of Science, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2003) 
(arguing that judges who are “unduly focused” on scientific methodology in 
applying Daubert “tend to reject reliable—albeit pragmatic—science, welcome 
unreliable—albeit authoritative—science, and thereby create a body of legal 
science that is out of sync with mainstream science”). 
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information. On the other hand, there are frailties in the process 
employed by the IQA that might leave agency staff handicapped in 
evaluating IQA petitions. The IQA does not provide an adversarial 
vetting of the petitions, thus an agency decision-maker will be 
looking at only one side of the issue and must rely on its staff to 
provide the remaining information needed for a fair evaluation. 
Being a political body, moreover, it is possible that an appointed 
official could rule on the quality of scientific research based in 
large part on political, rather than scientific considerations simply 
because it is expedient to do so. 
4. Forum Shopping 
Forum shopping between the courts and agencies for the most 
amenable ruling on the quality of scientific research seems 
inevitable once both agencies and courts are shackled by Daubert-
like complaint processes. Such forum shopping will only further 
confuse the legal system’s collective voice on scientific quality and 
lead to even more transaction costs in debating esoteric technical 
public health questions. In the summer of 2003, attorneys 
defending the asbestos industry in tort litigation engaged in 
precisely this forum shopping by filing an IQA petition requesting 
EPA to withdraw a 1986 manual warning auto mechanics about 
potential exposure to asbestos in brake linings.63 The pamphlet had 
been used by plaintiff attorneys to support their causation case, and 
the defense lawyers had been unsuccessful in excluding the 
evidence under Daubert.64 In their IQA petition, the defense 
attorneys argued that EPA’s documentation of the causal 
connection between exposure to asbestos in brake linings and 
asbestos diseases was incomplete and outdated in the pamphlet.65 
Even though the primary regulatory purpose for the manual was to 
warn auto mechanics about the risks of encountering asbestos in 
brake linings, the IQA subjects this type of information to the same 
                                                          
63 See Morgan, Lewis, & Bockius Petition, supra note 29. 
64 See, e.g., Andrew Schneider, EPA Warning on Asbestos is Under Attack, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 26, 2003, at A1. 
65 See Morgan, Lewis, & Bockius Petition, supra note 29, at 4-8. 
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reliability tests as basic research studies and scientific reports. Now 
revision of the manual appears to be high on EPA’s list of 
priorities solely because of this forum-shopping by frustrated 
litigants.66 
Conversely, in at least one instance a losing IQA petition has 
been appealed to the court of appeals, even though the IQA itself 
does not provide a right of judicial review.67 Although it was 
unclear how the petitioner could show adverse “direct 
consequences” to its organization as a result of public 
dissemination of the climate change models, and the complaint was 
later withdrawn,68 it is possible to imagine IQA challenges that 
will present more compelling judicial appeals in the future.69  
Thus, courts might be petitioned to review agency resolutions of 
IQA complaints, just as agencies consider administrative 
information that litigants are unsuccessful in excluding from the 
courts under Daubert. 
                                                          
66 See EPA Response to Morgan, Lewis, & Bockius Petition, Nov. 24, 
2003, available at http://www.epa.gov/oeiinter/qualityguidelines/afreqcorrection 
sub/12467response-morgan-lewis.pdf. 
67 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
68 See, e.g., Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, 
313 F.3d 852 (4th Cir. 2002). 
69 See, e.g., NAS, DATA QUALITY TRANSCRIPT, DAY 1, at 22-23, available 
at http://www7.nationalacademies.org/stl/4-21-02_Transcript.doc (comments of 
John D. Graham) (noting the uncertainty of judicial review and speculating that 
“it will probably take a few critical court decisions before we know how this law 
and the associated guidelines will be interpreted by judges”); id. at 73-74 
(comments of Alan Morrison) (speculating that under the Data Quality Act, 
courts will not hold “de novo review” of the science even though it is 
“theoretically possible” that they could); id. at 114-17 (comments of Fred 
Anderson) (speculating that parties will be able to get judicial review of agency 
information independent from a final rulemaking); id. at 143-44 (comments of 
Dan Cohen) (concluding that an agency’s ruling on a correction request is a final 
agency action subject to judicial review); id. at 173-74, 181-83 (comments of 
Professor Pierce) (expressing initial skepticism about whether courts can review 
challenges to agency information, and then later conceding that judicial review 
might be possible under limited circumstances). 
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B. Process Costs Associated with Implementing a Daubert-like 
Test 
1.  Exacerbating Imbalances in the Review of Science 
Daubert has been criticized for causing greater imbalance in 
adversarial processes because of the high costs associated with 
mounting and defending Daubert challenges.70 Litigants endowed 
with greater resources can gain an advantage by raising highly 
complex and even unjustified challenges to their less well-financed 
opponent’s scientific evidence in order to drain their time and 
resources. In civil cases, in fact, the cost of Daubert challenges 
appears to be drying up smaller damage litigation because 
defending against the inevitable Daubert challenges makes smaller 
litigation unprofitable.71 By contrast and somewhat perversely, 
forensic evidence introduced by prosecutors in criminal trials 
might not undergo rigorous Daubert scrutiny because of the 
prevalence of court appointed counsel and the correspondingly 
limited resources available for challenging prosecutors’ scientific 
evidence.72 Daubert thus helps the richer litigants gain an edge, 
                                                          
70 See, e.g., Ellen Relkin, To Hear or not to Hear: When Are Daubert 
Hearings Appropriate?, SF78 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 371, 375 (2001) (reporting that 
Daubert hearings can range from a few hours to numerous days and have 
evolved into virtual mini-trials involving a myriad of experts from both sides 
that can cost parties “tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars”); see also Denise 
M. Dunleavy, The Darwin Guide to Survival at a Daubert Challenge, 2Ann. 
2001 ATLA-CLE 2775 (2001) (providing lengthy recommendations for 
anticipating and then preparing for Daubert hearings, which resemble mini-
trials). 
71 See, e.g., Relkin, supra note 70, at 375 (observing that the costs of 
Daubert hearings are being factored into plaintiff attorneys’ decisions to reject 
meritorious cases when the injuries are not catastrophic); id. at 381 (reporting 
that the defendants’ costs of a Daubert hearing, which the court assigned to the 
losing plaintiffs, were $87,887.11 (although only $32,853.16 was documented) 
in one case and $26,921.62 in another). 
72 See, e.g., NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
WORKSHOP 51 (September 7, 2000), available at http:// 
www7.nationalacademies.org/stl/Scientific_Evidence_PDF.pdf. 
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while doing little for indigent parties who might be most 
disadvantaged by poor quality expert testimony.73 
The IQA repeats and amplifies these adversarial imbalances. 
First and similar to Daubert, the IQA petition process requires 
technical sophistication and resources.74 Those without resources 
to invest in this exercise may not be able to use the IQA. Rather 
than presenting an opportunity for broad-based improvements in 
scientific quality, the IQA may instead provide only a limited 
opportunity for established, well-financed interest groups to 
challenge regulatory information when they do not like the 
underlying policies or direction in which an agency is headed. 
Exacerbating this imbalance is the fact that IQA petitions are likely 
to slow down administrative processes simply by virtue of raising 
additional challenges to agency activities that must be resolved 
before rulemaking projects can proceed.75 Thus, at least for EPA, 
the sophisticated, established interest groups who actually bring 
IQA petitions will be limited primarily to the industrial sector since 
regulatory delay generally works at cross purposes with public 
interest groups’ goals of ensuring the expeditious promulgation of 
protective regulation.76 In fact, roughly two-thirds of the IQA 
petitions brought against EPA have been filed by industry.77 
                                                          
73 See, e.g., SKAPP REPORT, supra note 43, at 12-14. 
74 See supra note 33. 
75 See Wagner, supra note 3, at 106. 
76 The only sophisticated, “pro-environment” petition filed against EPA 
challenged a new exemption for the oil and gas industry from Clean Water Act 
requirements. Delaying the finalization of this exemption would actually lead to 
higher environmental protection in the interim, while the petition was being 
adjudicated and processed. 
77 If one culls out redundant and inapplicable filings, nearly two thirds of  
IQA petitions filed against EPA have been filed by regulated industries or 
representatives. See Envtl. Prot. Agency, IQA log, at http://www.epa.gov/ 
oeiinter/qualityguidelines/af_req_correction_sub.htm (last visited March 17, 
2004). Interestingly, by contrast, half the petitions filed against the Department 
of Interior (DOI) and the Forest Service (FS) are filed by environmental groups, 
with the other half filed by affected industry/resource users. See OMB Watch, 
Log of IQA Challenges, at http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/1417/ 
1/171/. In these cases, delays in timber harvesting or introducing new uses or 
species is beneficial to environmental interest groups. 
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Second, and in contrast to Daubert, not all science used in 
regulation is subject to the IQA. Instead, the IQA actually exempts 
a good portion of privately produced science and focuses 
predominantly on federally-funded science.78 Since recent 
accounts suggest potentially significant problems with the 
reliability of science sponsored by a regulated party and produced 
for regulation,79 the focus on public science in the IQA seems the 
reverse from what is needed. In fact, a good portion of tort 
litigation brought against “regulated” products after the regulator 
approved the products for marketing may be the result of 
unreliable, privately sponsored research that the regulatory 
agencies were forced to use to decide whether the products were 
safe.80 
Together these imbalances raise doubts about whether the IQA 
will improve regulatory science in any meaningful way, or instead 
simply opens a point of attack on a subset of regulatory relevant 
research where only a few affected parties have the resources or 
the incentives to file complaints. The one-directional nature of the 
                                                          
78 First and most sweeping is OMB’s decision to exempt from data quality 
challenges all information arising in “adjudications,” a term that includes 
information used in permit and licensing decisions. OMB Data Quality 
Guidelines, supra note 25, at 8460, § V.8. Although subtle, this exemption 
effectively removes from challenge all private information submitted by a 
regulated party to obtain a license to market a potentially dangerous product, 
including a pesticide, or to obtain a permit to discharge pollution on land, water, 
or into the air. OMB’s second exemption applies to third party information that 
agencies receive as “public filings.” Id. Thus, annual emissions inventories, 
compliance reports, and other filings required of industry under federal law also 
appear to be exempt from data quality challenges. Third, OMB exempts all 
private information classified as trade secret or confidential business 
information, classifications that can include a considerable amount of private 
information. Id. § V.3.b.ii.B.i. 
79 See, e.g., SHELDON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST: HAS 
THE LURE OF PROFITS CORRUPTED THE VIRTUE OF BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH? 
141-44 (2003); Justin E. Bekelman et. al., Scope and Impact of Financial 
Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review, 289 J. AM. 
MED. ASSOC. 454 (2003). 
80 See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Beyond Buckman: Wrongful 
Manipulation of the Regulatory Process in the Law of Torts, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 
549, 558-70 (2002). 
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IQA reforms—directed at public science, while exempting most 
private research—only serves to reinforce concerns about process 
imbalances. 
2. Potential for Harassment and Abuse of Process 
Courts have been the pawn in efforts to disparage and harass 
researchers through the ability of litigants to challenge scientific 
evidence, although this is rarely accomplished with Daubert 
challenges alone. A symposium in Law and Contemporary 
Problems, for example, explores how both plaintiff and defense 
attorneys abuse the third-party subpoena power to intimidate 
scientists whose research produces damaging findings for their 
position, even though the researchers are not involved directly in 
the litigation.81 The litigants typically accomplish this intimidation 
by filing overbroad subpoenas to individual scientists seeking the 
release of laboratory notebooks, data, and ongoing research.82 
When a public university employs the researcher, litigants have 
also used state public records statutes to file broad document 
production requests.83 In some cases, the overbroad requests have 
also included demands that confidential personal data be disclosed, 
and in one case the state judge ordered that it be turned over to the 
opposing party, R.J. Reynolds.84 Most courts, however, ultimately 
quash the subpoenas, once challenged, as overbroad; yet advocates 
seem to understand the gains that can be made simply from the 
threat of a subpoena or public records action against an 
unsuspecting scientist.85 These abuses of process resulted in at 
                                                          
81 See Symposium, Court-Ordered Disclosure of Academic Research: A 
Clash of Values of Science and Law, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1996). 
82 See, e.g., Bert Black, Research and its Revelation: When Should Courts 
Compel Disclosure?, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 173 (1996); see also 
Steven Picou, Compelled Disclosure of Scholarly Research: Some Comments on 
“High Stakes Litigation”, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 155 (1996). 
83 See Paul M. Fischer, Science and Subpoenas: When Do the Courts 
Become Instruments of Manipulation?, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 159 
(1996). 
84 Id. 
85 See, e.g., Black, supra note 82, at 183. 
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least one prominent researcher leaving his tenured position in 
disgust.86 
The misuse of legal tools to intimidate and discredit 
researchers can be expected to continue under the IQA. Nobel-
prize winning economist, George Ackerloff, observes that one of 
the best mechanisms for outsiders to assess the reliability of 
complex information is by the reputation of the person providing 
it.87 Disparaging a scientist, even when the disparagement is 
ultimately false, provides one means for undermining the veracity 
of complex scientific information. Filing IQA complaints, 
including complaints directed at a researcher, offer the possibility 
of not only impairing the researcher’s reputation, but promise also 
to drain the researcher’s time and energy if the researcher chooses 
to become involved in the agency’s IQA response. And in contrast 
to the courts, there are no legal deterrents, such as dismissing 
frivolous complaints or levying sanctions, to deter these abuses of 
process. Under the IQA, parties may file as many petitions as they 
like concerning virtually any information they please.88 The costs 
of processing the complaints, even if frivolous, are born by the 
agency and researchers if they are involved. 
Some organizations have already tipped their hand that 
intimidating and discrediting researchers may be among their plans 
under the IQA. In a complaint petitioning the exclusion of a study 
on the herbicide, Atrazine, for example, the industry complained 
that the researcher “has killed and continues to kill thousands of 
frogs in unvalidated tests that have no proven value.”89 The same 
                                                          
86 See Fischer, supra note 83. 
87 See George Ackerloff, The Market for ‘Lemons’: Qualitative Uncertainty 
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
88 See, e.g., OMB Data Quality Guidelines, supra note 25, at 8452. The 
mandated OMB guidelines interpreting the Data Quality Act provide for its 
broad application to “the sharing by Federal agencies of, and access to, 
information disseminated by Federal agencies.” Id. 
89 Kan. Corn Growers Petition, supra note 33, at 8. Hayes’ scientific 
credibility is further questioned in a number of related critiques of his research. 
See, e.g., Alex Avery, Frog Sex-Change Claims Flawed, Center for Global Food 
Issues (October 30, 2002) at http://www.cgfi.org/materials/articles/2002/ 
oct_30_02.htm; TRIAZINE NETWORK, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE HAYES ET AL. 
(2001)); Steven Milloy, Freaky-Frog Fraud, Fox News Channel, Nov. 8, 2002, 
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nonprofit then sent letters to the American Association of 
University Professors (AAUP) and a number of universities 
warning them to update their scientific freedom and responsibility 
policies to comply with the IQA,90 and indicating it plans to move 
upstream by communicating IQA challenges to the researchers’ 
federal funding sources.91 
Whether this professional discrediting and intimidation 
ultimately impairs the researcher’s scientific reputation within the 
scientific community or has other negative spillover effects is 
unclear, but nevertheless worrisome. While Daubert and the IQA 
are not essential to enable such attacks, they do provide additional 
public platforms for publicizing complaints against science and 
scientists. 
C. Countervailing Benefits of the IQA? 
Set against its considerable process and substantive costs, the 
potential benefits of the IQA appear both minimal and uncertain. 
                                                          
 
available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,69497,00.html; Steven 
Milloy, Frog Study Leaps to Conclusions, Fox News Channel, April 19, 2002, 
available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,50669,00.html. 
90 Ctr. for Regulatory Effectiveness, Letter from Jim Tozzi, Member, CRE 
Advisory Board, to Jane Buck, American Association of University Professors, 
3 (Aug. 6, 2003), available at http://www.thecre.com/pdf/university 
DQltrBuck.pdf. Identical letters were sent to a number of universities. 
91 See Industry Data Quality Warning to Universities Draws Sharp 
Response, INSIDE EPA, August 22, 2003. That article reports: 
A CRE source says the letter is meant to give universities a chance to 
be proactive about data quality requirements. “If they get on top now, it 
could save them a lot of problems in the future,” the source says. “If 
they don’t . . . we will be more direct in our concerns.” The source says 
the next step would be to inform a federal agency that material a 
university submitted cannot be disseminated. “If the agency agrees, 
then the question is, why give money to universities if they can’t do 
anything with their research funds? If we really start to invoke this, 
millions of federal government research dollars couldn’t be used . . . . 
We’ve been nice up to now. Rounds two and three, we’ll be more 
direct.” 
Id. 
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As discussed, without evidence of a preexisting problem with the 
quality of at least EPA’s science, it is unclear what facets of 
regulatory information are actually in need of repair. The fact that 
the Act was passed as an appropriations rider with no 
congressional discussion, and was written by an industry 
consultant who now makes a living filing IQA petitions, presents 
still more cause for concern.92 
Nevertheless, in the wake of the passage of the IQA, there is 
evidence of greater attention by agencies like the EPA to scientific 
quality. Over the last year and citing to the IQA, EPA and OMB 
have generated several new initiatives for increased quality control 
over regulatory science.93 Several of these initiatives have been 
criticized as misguided and politically motivated, but at least one 
initiative—improving the quality of EPA’s models—is 
promising.94 
The IQA may also cause agencies to think twice before 
disseminating information, although it is difficult to locate 
concrete evidence of this effect. Whether this ultimately is a 
benefit or a cost will depend on the circumstances. If agencies are 
disseminating bad information that misleads the public or harms 
regulated parties, creating incentives for greater quality control 
before disseminating information is precisely what is needed. 
                                                          
92 See supra note 23. 
93 See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Peer Review and Information Quality, 
Proposed Bulletin, August 2003, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
omb/inforeg/peer_review_and_info_quality.pdf; Memo from EPA 
Administrator Whitman (Feb. 7, 2003), available at http://www.thecre.com/ 
pdf/whitman_memo.pdf; Envtl. Prot. Agency, A Summary of General 
Assessment Factors for Evaluating the Quality of Scientific and Technical 
Information, 68 Fed. Reg. 39086 (2003). The guidelines are published 
electronically (and not in the Federal Register) at http://www.epa.gov/ 
oei/qualityguidelines/af— home.htm. 
94 EPA’s Assessment Factors were criticized quite heavily at a National 
Academy of Sciences Workshop, January 21, 2003. See Transcript from NAS, 
Assessment Factors Workshop. OMB’s proposed peer review bulletin generated 
even more criticism. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 41; Robert Steinbrook, Peer 
Review and Federal Regulations, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 103 (2004); Sharon 
Begley, White House Seeks Peer Review Standard for Range of Studies, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 5, 2003, at B1. 
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Conversely, if agencies become inclined to withhold information 
until the point at which they incorporate it into rulemakings., then 
the diminished scientific discourse could ultimately impair the 
quality of regulations and the thoroughness of public discussions in 
advance of rulemakings. 
III. REFORM 
The opportunity to look more broadly at implementation of a 
Daubert-like screening test in both the courts and agencies helps to 
spotlight several significant problems. First, these science-
screening tests offer advantages to sophisticated participants to 
manipulate decision-making, in part by overwhelming their 
opponents and even the decision-maker through the use of 
resource-intensive challenges to science. Second, the tests present 
the risk of significant substantive errors, especially in terms of 
conflating science and policy disputes. 
Both sets of problems could be addressed, at least 
preliminarily, by relatively simple reforms. With respect to the 
ability of sophisticated participants to abuse the screening devices 
to overwhelm opponents and the agencies, one straightforward 
remedy is to force those parties to pay for the costs of the process, 
and if they abuse it, to penalize the abuses. IQA petitions currently 
can be filed at any time, by anyone, and can include as many 
complaints and challenges as the petitioner desires. There are no 
meaningful costs or sanctions for filing meritless complaints. In 
contrast, the benefits of abusing the IQA process can be 
considerable to the regulated community: IQA challenges may lead 
to the exclusion or discrediting of pivotal studies that undergird 
protective regulation, and at the least they can divert an agency’s 
resources and priorities away from developing protective 
policies.95 Rule 37 already serves as a mechanism for penalizing 
frivolous Daubert challenges. 96 A similar type of penalty rule 
could be employed by the agencies in implementing the IQA. For 
example, if a petitioner does not raise a credible challenge under 
                                                          
95 See Wagner, supra note 3, at 106-08. 
96 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 37. 
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the IQA, then the petitioner should be forced to pay not only the 
agency’s processing costs, but a penalty. 
Second, with respect to the vague standard for determining 
scientific reliability, separating problems of research bias from 
other scientific reliability problems could help to clarify the criteria 
for screening scientific evidence and counteract the potential for 
petitioners to challenge policy choices under the guise of science. 
Currently, both Daubert and the IQA have been criticized for 
conflating problems of bias with problems concerning the 
reliability of research, and addressing neither (particularly the bias 
problem) effectively.97 Moreover, there is evidence that bias is a 
serious problem in policy-relevant scientific research, especially 
for research sponsored by manufacturers, waste producers, or 
regulatory participants or litigants.98 A number of empirical studies 
have found that when the research is sponsored, the sponsorship 
affects the outcome of the research in a way that is more favorable 
to the sponsor than independent research.99 There is also evidence 
that sponsors use contractual provisions to control the design and 
reporting of research that they sponsor.100 This means that adverse 
                                                          
97  Professor Patterson argues that Daubert conflates at least two important 
science-related problems that can afflict scientific evidence—bias on one hand 
and whether the testimony is actually scientific on the other. See Mark R. 
Patterson, Conflicts of Interest in Scientific Expert Testimony, 40 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1313 (1999). While the Daubert test could be read to encompass both 
concerns, it is applied narrowly in ways that generally consider only whether 
testimony is based on research that is testable or capable of validation, with 
almost no attention to the need to identify bias in the underlying research. This 
is an important oversight in the screening of scientific evidence since cross 
examination of the witness who relies on the research will not necessarily 
uncover blatant conflicts and sources of bias that affected the original researcher 
in conducting the research. 
98 See Michael J. Brennan, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Application of 
the “Best Scientific Data Available” Standard in the Endangered Species Act, 
16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 387, 410 (2003); see also Daniel T. Hornstein, Accounting 
for Science: The Independence of Public Research in the New Subterranean 
Administrative Law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227, 243 (2003). 
99 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
100 See, e.g., Frank Davidoff, Between the Lines: Navigating the 
Unchartered Territory of Industry-Sponsored Research, 21 HEALTH AFFAIRS 
235 (2002); Bruce M. Psaty & Drummond Rennie, Stopping Medical Research 
WAGNERMACRO2.DOC 4/23/2004  12:54 PM 
616 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
results might be suppressed or under-reported, while positive 
results might be presented in ways that overstate the positive 
findings. Both the IQA and Daubert, however, tend to ignore these 
important sources of bias in scientific research.101 
One reform to redress this research “bias” problem is to 
supplement the “reliability” tests of Daubert and the IQA with a 
conflict disclosure requirement.  The scientific community uses 
conflict disclosures to require disclosure not only of the sources of 
funding, but the types of sponsor influence—like contractual 
power to suppress adverse results or alter the written report of the 
findings—that might affect the rigor of the study. When employed 
by regulators and courts in a legal setting, such expanded conflict 
disclosures would require scientists who offer testimony or 
research to disclose all contractual and related constraints that 
could bias or constrain their work.102 Similarly, scientists who are 
employees of sponsors would be required to disclose the extent of 
sponsor influence over the design, methods, and reporting of their 
research. When the testimony or evidence is not being offered by 
                                                          
 
to Save Money: A Broken Pact with Researchers and Patients, 289 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N. 2128 (2003); Drummond Rennie, Fair Conduct and Fair Reporting of 
Clinical Trials, 282 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 1766 (1999); Drummond Rennie, 
Veronica Yank, & Linda Emanuel, When Authorship Fails: A Proposal to Make 
Contributors Accountable, 278 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 579 (1997); see also PAUL 
BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 
(1985); DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE 
WITH A DEADLY INDUSTRY (2001); GARY MARKOWITZ & DAVID ROSNER, 
DECEIT AND DENIAL: THE DEADLY POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION (2002); 
MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE 
DALKON SHIELD (1985). 
101 See, e.g., Frank Davidoff et al., Sponsorship, Authorship and 
Accountability, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 825 (2001), available at 
http://content.nejm.org/cgi/reprint/345/11/825.pdf; Jean Hellwege, Medical 
Journals Crack Down on Industry Influenced Over Published Studies, 37 TRIAL 
71 (DEC. 2001); Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts Submitted to 
Biomedical Journals (October 2001) at http://www.icmje.org (last visited Mar. 
2, 2004). 
102 This proposal was advanced by David Michaels and myself in David 
Michaels and Wendy E. Wagner, Science and Government: Disclosure in 
Regulatory Science, 302 SCIENCE 2073 (2003). 
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the original scientist, then those relying on the information would 
be required to work backwards to learn about potential conflicts 
and contractual constraints that might compromise the 
independence of the research.103 Both in the courts and agencies, 
these conflict disclosures need not be used to disqualify research or 
testimony, but they could provide critical information about 
potential sources of bias that might otherwise be missed.  
Adding this supplemental conflict disclosure will diminish the 
severity of several of the adverse side effects currently experienced 
under Daubert and the IQA. Most significantly, it offers a much 
more focused method for assessing the objectivity of research and 
the corresponding expert testimony than the amorphous Daubert 
test.104 This more focused approach to evaluating research and 
testimony should also help counteract the ability of well-financed, 
private parties to use Daubert and the IQA exclusively to their 
advantage.  A detailed conflict disclosure policy imposes a speed 
bump on all research. without requiring an outside, sophisticated 
advocate to intervene. The conflict disclosure requirement could 
even provide some protection against harassment of independent 
scientists who are most deserving of protection from the current 
abuses of process. 
CONCLUSION 
Daubert has not been without its problems. These problems are 
instructive as the agencies implement the IQA, a law that imposes 
a complaint process similar to Daubert on information 
disseminated by federal agencies. This commentary explores some 
of the adverse side effects that could arise in importing a Daubert-
like test to the agencies and suggests two straightforward reform 
proposals that begin to counteract these problems. 
 
                                                          
103 See id. 
104 See also Patterson, supra note 97, at 1366-86. 
